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When Montgolfier raised his first hot-air balloon in 1783 he was asked what
possible use it was. His answer was “What is the use of a child?” Fuzzy logic
is no longer a child, and it is therefore a bit misleading, now that we have
40,000 fuzzy logic web sites, several journals, fan clubs around the world, and
many successful applications, to base a critique of it on papers that are twenty
years old, as Susan Haack does in her 1996 edition of Deviant Logic. She is
quoting a ten year old child that has now grown to be thirty.
There is a certain quarrelsomeness in the discussion of the subject. It has been
called the “cocaine of science”1 and “pornography”2. This should not surprise;
abuse is common in logic. Locke called logicians “cattle ... whose thoughts
reach only to imitation” (Essay4.17.3/6/7),3 and Alexander Pope, accordingly,
speaks of “A hundred Head of Aristotle’s Friends...” (Dunciad iv, 191 ff.).
Diderot called logicians “dirty, fetid pedants.”4 These were summary
judgments of outsiders, but insult or at least derision is common as well within
the fraternity, in disputes between “traditional” logicians and “classical”
logicians, between the latter and advocates of relevance, Quine and modal
logicians, formalists and informalists, and so on. Now that fuzzy logicians invite
traditionalists and classicists to come out and play, they get sour looks.
It is instructive to look at earlier reactions to innovative logic systems, for
instance Quine on modal logic. If you believed him, or perhaps better, if you
believed in him, as some of people I respect actually did, you did not pay much
attention to modal systems when the field exploded after 1961. This same lot
can now talk about modal logic as a fad that has passed. Many years ago,
when I came home much excited from a performance of Orff’s Carmina
Burana my roommate challenged me to name one thing in that piece that
Stravinsky had not done before. Of course I could not. But as with modal logic,
it was fun. So even if, perhaps, the modal logic has no application to practical
logic, it is fun while one is at it, rather like music, in fact. Quine was not able to
warn me off modal logic any more than my mother was able to warn me off
girls. Is it perhaps the same with fuzzy logic? There is the gaming aspect to it,
the sheer fun of exploring its premisses, and the stunning successes, to which
Woods repeatedly calls attention, of its engineering applications. But perhaps
engineering is all there is to it, and the field of informal logic is a separate thing
that is neither helped nor hindered by the fuzzy stuff.

Fuzzy sets were described by Zadeh in 19655 to deal with vagueness.
According to Brulé, Plato laid the foundation to what would become fuzzy logic
when he said that there was a third region (beyond True and False) where
these opposites “tumble about.”6 My own understanding of fuzzy sets does not
go much beyond Plato’s. For this reason, and for lack of time I won’t attempt to
insert even a brief tutorial at this point.7 Zadeh also sought to make truth into a
fuzzy notion, introducing such expressions as “very true”, and the like. Much of
the criticism of his work centers on this attempt, which Haack and others take
to be misguided. I shall not pursue this, and will instead say a few words about
the bigger fish that Woods deals with, starting at the end.

He, as Haack did before, make much of the fact that there is an underlying
logic, or logical framework to fuzzy logic that is “entirely classical.” Woods
says, “It is rather striking that all these engineering applications are generated
within a logico-mathematical framework that is entirely classical” (17). This
goes a long way toward explaining, he maintains, why this stuff works.

I don’t quite know what to make of this argument. Anything a computer does is
classical at least in the sense that at the machine level only two values are
available, on or off. Everything else must be achieved with networks of on and
off switches. Suppose you listen to a compact disk of Mozart’s Clarinet Quintet
(as I was doing when writing this). Why does it work, i.e. , sound so good? Not,
John Woods seems to tell us, because the music is by Mozart, and James
Campbell is a mean clarinet player, but because the recording is produced
and reproduced within a logico-mathematical framework that is entirely
classical. But apparently, computers can deal with sound, with crescendo and
glissando, etc. on the basis of a “classical” computer architecture. From the
nature of the computer architecture we cannot conclude that what we listened
to was in a deep sense not music. And so also, even if the “underlying” logic,
the “logical framework” is classical, it can still deal with real vagueness, and not
only with some surrogate of it.

Moving back from the end of John’s paper, we find a reference to Heidegger
and coping. I agree with a bit of what Heidegger is saying: consciousness is a
rather perfunctory public relations effort of the mind, and a lot of problem
solving and reasoning, though perhaps not arguing, takes place on a preconscious or sub-conscious level. I do not think, however, that linguistic coping,
as contrasted with conscious conversation, is as common as Woods thinks.
One does tend to come to this conviction, however, after many years in
academic administration.

Now to his example of coping: the short order cook in New York. Let me
describe another case that is actually cited in the fuzzy literature. I quote Brulé:

The first major commercial application was in the area of cement kiln
control, an operation which requires that an operator monitor four
internal states of the kiln, control four sets of operations, and
dynamically manage 40 or 50 "rules of thumb" about their
interrelationships, all with the goal of controlling a highly complex set of
chemical interactions. One such rule is “If the oxygen percentage is
rather high and the free-lime and kiln-drive torque rate is normal,
decrease the flow of gas and slightly reduce the fuel rate.”8

I have worked at a blast furnace and at a cement kiln, so I know whereof we
talk here. It is true enough that the controller does these things rather
automatically, perhaps even sometimes without consciousness. But that does

not mean that the entire area of cement kiln control falls into the domain of the
subcortical, prelinguistic, unconscious. The teaching of these techniques
typically involves the expression in language of the rules of thumb, and their
conscious absorption. The fact that someone can control a lime-kiln by just
coping does not mean that he learned to cope on a level appropriately
described as subcortical, subconscious, prelinguistic and non-linear (p. 10).
Expressions formulated in the fuzzy vocabulary may yet be the best way of
formalizing the language used in lime-kiln operation instruction. In a way, then, I
agree with Woods when he says that “there exists abundant evidence that a
good deal of reasoning in subconscious. To the extent that this is so, fuzzy
logic may well be a model of the right type” (16). But I don’t know if he wants to
draw a rigid line here or not. He seems to suggest that practical reasoning is
sometimes conscious and sometimes not (16) and that fuzzy logic is not a
model for it if it is conscious, since consciousness “cannot abide high levels of
information.” But there is a step missing in the argument. It may be true that
fuzzy logic can handle very large amounts of information, but for this argument
to go through, it must be shown that it cannot handle small amounts. The
quotation from Zadeh on p. 16 does not seem to me to support Woods’s point.
He says, rather, that precise statements about very complex systems are
unmanageable, but fuzzy ones are not.

I mention another problem in passing. Earlier in the paper John makes
reference to Quine’s contrast between the meager traces of input upon the
senses, and the torrential output of theories, claims, etc. (p. 8). Later we hear
about torrential input and processing, and meager output. I can’t quite get
these two things together, but that may just be a misunderstanding. I am
similarly puzzled by the claim that fuzzy logic is unmanageably complex (p.7),
more so, evidently, than the classical version, but that it is able to deal with
vastly more data at one time.

I now come to the claim that classical logic does not fail in English. This is
interpreted (p. 11 f.) as meaning that there are no argument forms in the
classical predicate calculus that fail in English. “Classical” is not altogether
clear, but I take it to mean a bivalent system of logic, with a non-empty domain,
quantifiers and extensionally defined connectives. Now the passage quoted
from Zadeh (p. 11) does not suggest that this is what he had in mind. His claim
seems to be, rather, that there cases of “human reckoning” that are not well
captured in a “rigorous mathematical foundation.” And this, surely, is true.
Classical logic is a blunt instrument that fails to catch many interesting types of
argument, enthymemes among them, but also cases in which vagueness plays
a role.

Let me conclude with the following observation. A logic system does not only
allow one to devise, evaluate and make precise arguments. Some of them can
be, and have been, used to model human belief, decision and action. Some
years ago, and even now in some quarters, it was held that a person’s
confidence in a proposition (e.g. that the plane he is about to board will in fact
arrive) is to be described by a precise fraction m/n with 0 = m/n = 1. This
fraction was thought to be determinable by bets and similar devices. But this,
surely, is just silly. What we are dealing with here is a vague probability, a field
best explored by using fuzzy probability logic. Fuzzy logic has certainly had the

salutary effect of putting an end to the specious search for precision where
none exists.
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